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Dec., 1953
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF COLORADO LAW
The following is a summary of material presented on October
23, 1953, at the 55th Annual Convention of the Colorado Bar Asso-
ciation. This is the fourth annual survey of developments in Colo-
rado law and was prepared and presented under the direction of
Gordon C. Johnston, dean of the University of Denver College of
Law. Subjects have been grouped arbitrarily to best suit the abili-
ties of the attorneys who prepared the material. Subjects not re-
viewed in this issue will be published in the January, 1954, issue
of Dicta.-Editor.
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
EDWARD C. KING of the Bounlder Bar
LEGISLATION
The following are changes in the statutory law relating to wills
and estates which were made in 1953 and which appear in Session
Laws of Colorado 1953. References are to chapters.
Chapter 111 relates to the distribution of property by the trus-
tee of an express trust, when such distribution is made pursuant
to the exercise of, or in default of, the exercise of a power of ap-
pointment. The law is for the protection of trustees. Its effect can
best be illustrated 'by an example, as follows: Suppose that "A"
by will has created a trust for the benefit of his wife "B" for life,
with remainder as she shall by will appoint and in default of ap-
pointment to "C". The wife "B" dies, apparently intestate and in de-
fault of appointment the trustee distributes the remainder of the
estate of "C". Shortly thereafter a will of the wife "B" is found and
is admitted to probate in Colorado. This will appoints the remainder
to "D". In the absence of statute the trustee would be liable to
"D" for the amount of the remainder improperly distributed to "C".
The new statute provides, however, that if such erroneous
distribution is made not sooner than six months after the death of
the donee of such power ("B" in the illustration) the trustee shall
not be responsible to "D".
The statute also provides that the trustee shall not be liable
for distribution pursuant to the exercise of a power made in an
invalid instrument, if the trustee is not aware of the invalidity.
Chapter 124 contains an amendment to the gift tax law which
provides that if a donor dies, or has a guardian or conservator
appointed, before making a return which he should have made,
his personal representative shall make such return.
Chapter 132, relating to inheritance taxes, provides for com-
promise or arbitration when there are conflicting claims as to the
domicile of the decedent at the time of his death.
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Chapter 156 makes substantial changes in that portion of
Chapter 93, 1935 C.S.A., which relates to homesteads. It makes
changes in the method of creating a homestead, in the wording
relative to sale of homesteaded property on execution, in the treat-
ment of exempt proceeds used for another home which becomes
a homestead, in the disposition of insurance on improvements on
the homestead and in conveying or encumbering homesteaded prop-
erty. These matters are merely mentioned as a warning that the
new act should require careful study. Only one portion of the new
act would appear to relate directly to wills and estates and that
is the new section 29 (A) which provides that if property is en-
tered as a homestead by a joint tenant who is the husband or wife
of the other joint tenant, then upon the death of either spouse the
homestead shall continue in effect on the interest in such property
of the surviving spouse. The same is true upon the death of a joint
tenant leaving an orphan child or children as surviving joint
tenants.
Chapter 250 provides that no act of a fiduciary appointed by
a court shall be invalid solely by reason of any order thereafter
entered revoking or setting aside the appointment, or by reason
of revocation of the probate of a will or by a finding of mental
competency.
Chapter 251 is the result of the decision of the Supreme Court
in Hoff v. Armbruster, 125 Colo. 198,1 decided in March, 1953,
where the court found that the mutual and recipifocal wills of a
husband and wife were contractual and, in effect, irrevocable. The
case merely confirmed the rule which had been in effect in Colo-
rado since the case of Brown v. Johanson, 69 Colo. 400,2 but it
alarmed many attorneys and it was sought to change the rule by
this act which provides that to establish an agreement to make a
will, such agreement must be proved clear, satisfactory and con-
vincing evidence, and that the fact that two or more wills were
executed at or about the same time by different persons shall not
of itself be evidence that such wills were made in consideration
of each other.
The first part of the act merely states the existing law, for
it has been said in a number of cases that the evidence to estab-
lish such a contract must be clear, strong and unequivocal.
The latter phrase of the act seems ineffective because it has
never been the law, either before or after the Armbruster case,
that if two or more wills are executed at or about the same time
that in itself is evidence that they were made in consideration of
each other. It is the reciprocal and mutual aspect of the wills that
has lead the court to consider them contractual, rather than the
fact that they were both made on Monday. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the act makes no change in the existing law.
1242 P. (2d) 604.
2 194 P. 943. (1920)
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The act does raise a question of considerable importance. Sec-
tion 8 of our Statute of Frauds says that every contract for the
sale of lands shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, be in writing.
It has been held that a contract to make a will of real estate falls
within this section. Could it be said that it was the purpose of the
new act to substitute clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
for the writing required by the Statute of Frauds?
Chapter 252, the new spouse's allowance statute, is in some
respects very confusing. The following are the most important
new features of this act:
a. It provides that if real estate is used by the owner and
family as a home, and the owner shall die or be adjudged in-
competent, the court, after hearing, may permit the spouse or
minor children to remain in possession without payment of
rent upon such terms as the court directs.
b. It also provides that upon the death of a person the
court may make reasonable provision for the surviving spouse
or the minor children of decedent after appointment of a
fiduciary for such estate, and that all payments made for such
purpose shall be deducted from the widow's or children's al-
lowance.
c. The widow's or children's allowance is increased to
$3,500.
d. It provides that if a widow and children (not children
of the widow) survive decedent the allowance is apportioned
between them in such manner as the court deems just.
e. It provides that when a person shall be adjudged a
mental incompetent the court may set over to the spouse or
minor children, such articles of personal property "as it
deems necessary for the use of such former spouse or minor
children, and may make such allowances for the support of the
spouse and minor children as the court may direct but not
exceeding $3,500 until claims are paid." Just what is meant
by a former spouse is not clear.
Chapter 253 has to do with the death, resignation or removal
of fiduciaries. It is too long and involved to examine here. It takes
the place of Sections 90, 91, and 92 of Chapter 176, C.S.A. 1935.
Chapter 254. The statute relating to determination of heir-
ship in cases where heirship has not been determined during the
County Court administration of an estate has never seemed en-
tirely satisfactory. The law was amended in 1951 and now again
it is amended by this Chapter 254. The principal changes made
by the new law are as follows:
I. Section 29, Chapter 176, C.S.A. 1935 as amended in
1951 is further amended by adding a proviso that no mailing
of a copy of the notice shall be necessary where a consent has
been executed or the heir has been personally served or has
waived or acknowledged service of notice.
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2. Section 33, Chapter 176 as amended in 1951, which
provided that proceedings under the act might be joined with
an action affecting real property under the Rules and that
in the event of such joinder the proceeding shall be conducted
in compliance with the Rules, is repealed effective January
1, 1954.
3. A new section 33 states that in event of joinder the
complaint shall set forth the matters required for the petition
under the Act, the alleged heirs shall be joined as defendants,
and the proceeding conducted in accordance with the Rules.
There is doubt, however, as to the validity of this new
section 33 as it appears to have been inserted improperly in
the Act.
Chapter 255 amends the small estates law by changing the
size of small estates from $500 or less to $1,000 or less.
Chapter 256 relates to a joint federal income and gift tax
returns and provides that on petition of a personal representative
he shall have authority, when authorized by the County Court, to
join with the decedent's spouse or a ward in a joint federal in-
come tax return, to require such indemnity as the court may deem
proper, to consent to gifts made by the spouse of a decedent or
ward, for federal gift tax purposes, and to enter into contracts
with the spouse of a decedent or ward in respect to joint income
tax returns.
Chapter 257 amends Sec. 217, Ch. 176, 1935 C.S.A. relating
to reports of fiduciaries. It requires that every fiduciary shall file
with the court every six months after his appointment a report
in the form and manner as the court may require, until the estate
is fully settled, etc. While the act is one concerning estates, it im-
mediately raises the question whether all fiduciaries, including
testimentary trustees not subject to court jurisdiction and trustees
under living trusts, are now required to file reports. Certainly they
are fiduciaries and certainly the act contains no exception. It
again demonstrates the danger of using the word "fiduciary"
without discrimination.
Chapter 268 relates to wills offered for probate under Sec. 60,
Ch. 176, 1935 C.S.A. and injects a number of new requirements
as to procedure when wills are contested under the provisions of
Sec. 63 of Ch. 176. The details of the new provisions cannot be
be considered here, but in any case where there is a will contest
this chapter should be referred to, as it makes important changes.
The old law provided that a date for the hearing on a will
should be not less than ten or more than sixty days after the peti-
tion is filed. This new act omits the ten-day provision.
DECISIONS
The only Colorado cases decided by the Supreme Court during
the year which relates to Wills and Estates and which seem worthy
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of comment are the following:
Ostad v. Sarconi,.3 ------- Colo ......... 252 P. 2d 94 (Dec.
22, 1952). Will contest. The court held that in determin-
ing whether or not the question of undue influence should
be submitted to the jury every favorable inference fairly
deducible, and every favorable presumption fairly aris-
ing, from the evidence, must be considered as facts proved
in favor of contestants.
Broadhead v. Robinson,4 254 P. 2d 857 (Feb. 9, 1953).
This was a case in which the Manager of Revenue filed a
claim against an estate for back personal property taxes
on jewelry found among decedent's possession at the time
of her death. It was held that the claim was subject to
hearing and determination as in civil action in courts of
record, subject to the proviso that the claimant could not
prove the claim by his own oath. The burden of proof was
on claimant and the statutory presumption that the assess-
ment rolls are prima facie evidence of the validity of a
tax does not shift the burden of proof to the taxpayer.
Cunningham v. Stender,5 255 P. 2d 977 (March 30,
1953). A will which is attacked on the ground of lack of
mental capacity of the testator may be upheld if it repre-
sented the wishes of the testatrix and she (1) understood
the nature of her act, (2) knew the extent of her property,
(3) understood the disposition she was making and (4)
knew the natural object of her bounty.
In re MeGarys Estate,6 258 P. 2d 770 (May 25, 1953).
This interesting case held that, in the absence of an at-
testation clause, due execution of a will cannot be pre-
sumed merely from the fact that the signatures of the
testator and witnesses are genuine. No cases were cited.
The decision is based, and apparently with justification,
on the terms of Sections 39 and 61, ch. 176, and Laws of
1947, Ch. 340, Sec. 1. The rule seems, however, to be rather
harsh because in most states due execution of the will is
evidenced by the mere fact that the witnesses have signed.
In re Clayton's Estate, 259 P. 2d 617 (June 29, 1953).
This case, as its name indicates, had to do with the will
of George W. Clayton, who died in 1899, and certain as-
pects of which were passed upon by the Supreme Court
forty years ago. The will gave the residue of the estate
to the City of Denver in trust for the Clayton College.
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The question here for decision was the validity of a lease
to the Park Hill Golf Club made by the Trust Commission
which was created by city ordinance to administer the
trust. The City contended that the lease was void because
the Trust Commission had no power to lease and because
the lease was not approved by the County Court. It was
held that the City was estopped to deny the validity of its
own ordinance, that the power to lease was clearly im-
plied by the terms of the will which directed administra-
tion of the trust to produce income and that no order of
court was needed because, for the purpose, an implied
power is the same as an expressed power.
Means v. Simon,8 260 P. 2d 598 (August 3, 1953).
In this complicated case "A" had sold real estate to "B".
"A" was adjudged a mental incompetent and "C" ap-
pointed her conservator. The conservator succeeded in
setting aside the sale and was ordered to pay the pur-
chase money which had been received by "A" into the
registry of the court. The conservator, "C", withdrew the
money from a savings account and died without paying it
to the court. "C2" was then appointed conservator and
filed a claim against the estate of "Cl", claiming the
money was a trust fund in the hands of both "A" and his
conservator. The court held that it was not a special trust
fund in the hands of either "C" or his estate.
Thuet v. Thuet,9 260 P. 2d 204 (July 20, 1953). Lena
Thuet, who owned a farm, in 1942 executed a deed con-
veying the property to her daughter, Marie, and delivered
the same to a bank with a letter of instruction. This letter
stated that the deed was delivered to the bank without
power of recall, that it was to take effect presently and
that upon the death of the grantor the deed was to be de-
livered to the said Marie, the grantor reserving the privi-
lege of occupancy during her life. The deed was executed
and delivered to the bank without the knowledge of the
grantor's husband or the grantee. After the death of the
grantor it was sought to have the deed declared void on
the ground that it was in fraud of the husband's prop-
erty rights, that the property remained under control of
the grantor and that the transfer was colorable and testa-
mentary. In deciding for the grantee the court said that
the owner of property has the right to convey the same
without the consent or knowledge of the spouse, that a
deed may be delivered to a third person with instructions
to deliver it to the grantee upon the grantor's death and
that it is not essential to a valid delivery that the grantee
knows of the deed's existence.
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